# Security model ## Public Azure deployment The Azure topology supports certificate-authenticated P2S or direct enrollment. P2S keeps AD services inside the VNet. Direct enrollment exposes the required AD, DNS/DoH, WinRM, broker and RustDesk ports only to explicit public IPv4 CIDRs; an empty allowlist exposes none of them. Azure NSG and Windows Firewall enforce the same source list. RDP uses a separate allowlist. See [azure-vpn-deployment.md](azure-vpn-deployment.md). ## Password handling - The Credential Provider receives the password in Lithnet's secure password control and keeps that `SecureString` for Windows serialization. - A temporary managed string is unavoidable when creating the HTTPS JSON body. The unmanaged conversion buffer is zeroed immediately with `Marshal.ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode`; managed references are released as soon as each request completes. - The broker uses the exact received value for both NTLM and AD `SetPassword`. - The `SGU - Institutional password authority` fine-grained AD password policy applies only to the global security groups `SGU-Alumnos`, `SGU-Administrativos`, and `SGU-Docentes`. It disables AD complexity, history, and password age requirements and permits passwords from one character onward so a password accepted by SGO is never altered or rejected by AD. The default domain password policy remains unchanged. The group is assigned before `SetPassword` for newly created users. Bootstrap reapplies the policy via `Set-SguInstitutionalPasswordPolicy.ps1`. - Managed `Usuarios-SGU` accounts deny the SELF and Everyone `Change Password` extended right. Only an administrator or the broker through the separate `Reset Password` right can replace the AD password. - The `SGU - User session restrictions` GPO also hides the **Change a password** command from the Windows Ctrl+Alt+Delete security screen for managed users. This is a user-interface complement to the directory ACL, not a substitute for it. - There is no HMAC password, pepper, local password cache, Supabase password, or other derived credential in this Windows path. - Neither application logs request bodies or passwords. Deployment configuration contains certificate thumbprints, not passwords or private keys. ## Transport - HTTPS is mandatory on both links. - Credential Provider to broker uses mutual TLS. The provider requires normal Windows certificate validation and pins the configured server certificate. - The broker requires a trusted client certificate and an explicit allow-listed thumbprint. - Client private keys are non-exportable and reside in `LocalMachine\My`. - The NTLM validator rejects non-HTTPS redirects, URI user information, and hosts outside its explicit redirect allow-list. - Authentication and profile enrichment read only allow-listed HTTPS pages. Profile bodies are capped at 512 KiB by default; portal cookies are request-scoped and held only in memory. ## Profile minimization - Administrative enrichment first verifies the employee number and reads employee type/status, email, job title, and department from the incident overview. Only after that match, it reads given names and paternal/maternal surnames and the normalized `Male`/`Female` value from the personal page plus street, exterior/interior number, neighborhood, locality, state, and postal code from the location page. AD stores only the controlled `SGU-Gender` line, not the original HTML field. - Administrative birth date, RFC, CURP, blood type, marital status, nationality, telephone, email lists, housing type, and emergency-contact fields are ignored. - Student enrichment reads only the matching student number, given names, paternal/maternal surnames, email, career, street, neighborhood, city/municipality, state, postal code, and normalized sex from known element IDs. - Student CURP, birth date, blood type, marital status, telephone, mobile, guardian, medical, financial, and academic-history values are ignored. - Professor enrichment keeps the menu display name as its base. From the payroll consultation header it reads only a matching employee number, name, email, employee type/status, job title, and the optional department field. It then optionally reads the same structured-name and postal-address element IDs used by staff pages. A missing professor route or element never makes authentication fail. - Payroll/receipt contents, incident details, calendars, photographs, manager names, and manager positions are deliberately ignored. - The employee or student number must match the authenticated `AD` or `AL` key before role-specific metadata is synchronized. The two supplemental administrative pages are never requested unless the incident page supplied the matching employee number. Professor payroll metadata independently requires the matching six-digit number, and every supplemental request uses the same fresh, request-scoped NTLM session as its menu fallback. - If SGU changes its HTML, authentication and exact-password synchronization continue without enrichment; existing AD metadata is not erased. - Slow profile pages cannot change an accepted credential into a rejection. The lightweight NTLM root is authoritative; enrichment has its own independent total timeout. Lab self-signed certificates are appropriate only for the isolated VM network. Use an enterprise CA with revocation checking in production. ## Recovery and availability The provider distinguishes an SGU rejection from unavailable infrastructure: - `400`/`401`: do not create or update the account and do not submit a Windows credential. An explicit SGO rejection is authoritative, including when an older AD password still exists. - `DIRECTORY_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILED`: SGO accepted the password but AD did not record it. Show a specific error and do not attempt Windows logon against a potentially stale AD verifier. - timeout, TLS/connectivity error, `429`, or `5xx`: submit the unchanged credential to Windows only for a genuine broker/SGO outage. Windows must still validate it against AD or its cached domain verifier, so this does not grant access without a domain credential. This continuity path can accept a last-known AD password while SGO is unreachable; decide explicitly whether that availability trade-off is appropriate for each deployment. - usernames that do not match the institutional key format go directly to Windows and are never sent to SGU or provisioned by the broker. Allowing an SGO-accepted three-character password also allows that short password at the native AD logon surface. Broker rate limiting does not protect direct AD authentication; domain network exposure and monitoring therefore remain essential. The policy cannot make a weak upstream password strong. Redis is deliberately not used for password continuity. A second persistent password verifier duplicates attackable credential material, while a reversible encrypted password becomes a credential vault. AD and Windows cached domain logon already implement the required last-known-password behavior. See [`decisions/0001-no-password-cache.md`](decisions/0001-no-password-cache.md). The installer never registers a Credential Provider filter and never disables Microsoft's password, PIN, smart-card, or Windows Hello providers. ## Operational controls - Limit the firewall rule to the Domain profile and required client networks. - Delegate the broker service account only to `OU=Usuarios-SGU` and its managed child OUs. - Keep broker/client certificates short lived and rotate their allow-list entries. - Monitor service availability and AD provisioning events without enabling HTTP body logging. - Test uninstall and the built-in password provider before broad rollout. - Do not test a new build first on a physical production endpoint; use a VM with a recent checkpoint and a known local administrator recovery account.