Honor exact SGO passwords for managed domain users

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alexrg committed 2026-09-24 13:22:12 -06:00
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@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ the same source list. RDP uses a separate allowlist. See
`Marshal.ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode`; managed references are released as soon
as each request completes.
- The broker uses the exact received value for both NTLM and AD `SetPassword`.
- The `SGU - Institutional password authority` fine-grained AD password policy
applies only to the global security groups `SGU-Alumnos`,
`SGU-Administrativos`, and `SGU-Docentes`. It disables AD complexity,
history, and password age requirements and permits passwords from one
character onward so a password accepted by SGO is never altered or rejected
by AD. The default domain password policy remains unchanged. The group is
assigned before `SetPassword` for newly created users. Bootstrap reapplies
the policy via `Set-SguInstitutionalPasswordPolicy.ps1`.
- Managed `Usuarios-SGU` accounts deny the SELF and Everyone `Change Password`
extended right. Only an administrator or the broker through the separate
`Reset Password` right can replace the AD password.
@@ -89,13 +97,25 @@ Use an enterprise CA with revocation checking in production.
The provider distinguishes an SGU rejection from unavailable infrastructure:
- `400`/`401`: do not create or update the account; submit the unchanged
credential to Windows so an existing AD account can authenticate.
- `400`/`401`: do not create or update the account and do not submit a Windows
credential. An explicit SGO rejection is authoritative, including when an
older AD password still exists.
- `DIRECTORY_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILED`: SGO accepted the password but AD did not
record it. Show a specific error and do not attempt Windows logon against a
potentially stale AD verifier.
- timeout, TLS/connectivity error, `429`, or `5xx`: submit the unchanged
credential to Windows. Windows must still validate it against AD or its cached
domain verifier, so this does not grant access without a domain credential.
credential to Windows only for a genuine broker/SGO outage. Windows must still
validate it against AD or its cached domain verifier, so this does not grant
access without a domain credential. This continuity path can accept a
last-known AD password while SGO is unreachable; decide explicitly whether
that availability trade-off is appropriate for each deployment.
- usernames that do not match the institutional key format go directly to
Windows and are never sent to SGU or provisioned by the broker.
Windows and are never sent to SGU or provisioned by the broker.
Allowing an SGO-accepted three-character password also allows that short
password at the native AD logon surface. Broker rate limiting does not protect
direct AD authentication; domain network exposure and monitoring therefore
remain essential. The policy cannot make a weak upstream password strong.
Redis is deliberately not used for password continuity. A second persistent
password verifier duplicates attackable credential material, while a reversible