Honor exact SGO passwords for managed domain users
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@@ -67,9 +67,16 @@ moves it to the mapped OU when required, sets `userPrincipalName`, and passes
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that same password directly to ADSI `SetPassword`. This is an idempotent UPSERT
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performed on every successful sign-in, so the next sign-in after an institutional
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password change updates AD before Windows validates the interactive logon. If
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SGU rejects the credential or is unavailable, the unchanged credentials go to
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Windows; only an existing AD account can then authenticate. A matching username
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pattern alone never provisions an account.
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SGU explicitly rejects the credential, the provider stops without trying AD.
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If SGO accepts it but AD synchronization fails, the provider reports that
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failure without trying a stale AD verifier. Only a genuine broker/SGO outage
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uses the documented Windows cached-domain-credential fallback, for an existing
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account. A matching username pattern alone never provisions an account.
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The domain bootstrap creates a fine-grained password policy for the three SGU
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role security groups. It allows the broker to record the exact password SGO
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accepted, even when the normal domain complexity policy would reject it. It
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does not relax password requirements for other domain accounts.
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Before an account becomes usable, the broker applies explicit deny ACEs for the
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Active Directory `Change Password` extended right to SELF and Everyone. Users
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