Honor exact SGO passwords for managed domain users
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@@ -67,9 +67,16 @@ moves it to the mapped OU when required, sets `userPrincipalName`, and passes
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that same password directly to ADSI `SetPassword`. This is an idempotent UPSERT
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performed on every successful sign-in, so the next sign-in after an institutional
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password change updates AD before Windows validates the interactive logon. If
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SGU rejects the credential or is unavailable, the unchanged credentials go to
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Windows; only an existing AD account can then authenticate. A matching username
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pattern alone never provisions an account.
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SGU explicitly rejects the credential, the provider stops without trying AD.
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If SGO accepts it but AD synchronization fails, the provider reports that
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failure without trying a stale AD verifier. Only a genuine broker/SGO outage
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uses the documented Windows cached-domain-credential fallback, for an existing
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account. A matching username pattern alone never provisions an account.
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The domain bootstrap creates a fine-grained password policy for the three SGU
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role security groups. It allows the broker to record the exact password SGO
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accepted, even when the normal domain complexity policy would reject it. It
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does not relax password requirements for other domain accounts.
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Before an account becomes usable, the broker applies explicit deny ACEs for the
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Active Directory `Change Password` extended right to SELF and Everyone. Users
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
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# v0.6.19 — SGO password authority
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- Add a fine-grained Active Directory password policy scoped to the three
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`SGU-*` role groups. A password accepted by SGO is stored unchanged in AD,
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including short passwords that the default domain complexity policy rejects.
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Other domain accounts keep their existing policy.
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- Apply and verify this policy during server bootstrap. Existing SGU accounts
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receive it through their role-group membership.
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- Stop institutional login immediately when SGO explicitly rejects a password.
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When SGO accepts it but AD synchronization fails, show a distinct error
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instead of trying an older AD password.
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- Preserve the documented cached-domain fallback only while the broker or SGO
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is genuinely unavailable.
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Operational validation: on the domain controller, disposable users in each of
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`SGU-Alumnos`, `SGU-Administrativos`, and `SGU-Docentes` accepted a three-character
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password and were removed after the test. The three originally reported
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accounts still require a real SGO sign-in to finish AD provisioning; no student
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password was requested or stored for testing.
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+25
-5
@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ the same source list. RDP uses a separate allowlist. See
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`Marshal.ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode`; managed references are released as soon
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as each request completes.
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- The broker uses the exact received value for both NTLM and AD `SetPassword`.
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- The `SGU - Institutional password authority` fine-grained AD password policy
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applies only to the global security groups `SGU-Alumnos`,
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`SGU-Administrativos`, and `SGU-Docentes`. It disables AD complexity,
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history, and password age requirements and permits passwords from one
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character onward so a password accepted by SGO is never altered or rejected
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by AD. The default domain password policy remains unchanged. The group is
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assigned before `SetPassword` for newly created users. Bootstrap reapplies
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the policy via `Set-SguInstitutionalPasswordPolicy.ps1`.
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- Managed `Usuarios-SGU` accounts deny the SELF and Everyone `Change Password`
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extended right. Only an administrator or the broker through the separate
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`Reset Password` right can replace the AD password.
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@@ -89,13 +97,25 @@ Use an enterprise CA with revocation checking in production.
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The provider distinguishes an SGU rejection from unavailable infrastructure:
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- `400`/`401`: do not create or update the account; submit the unchanged
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credential to Windows so an existing AD account can authenticate.
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- `400`/`401`: do not create or update the account and do not submit a Windows
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credential. An explicit SGO rejection is authoritative, including when an
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older AD password still exists.
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- `DIRECTORY_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILED`: SGO accepted the password but AD did not
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record it. Show a specific error and do not attempt Windows logon against a
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potentially stale AD verifier.
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- timeout, TLS/connectivity error, `429`, or `5xx`: submit the unchanged
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credential to Windows. Windows must still validate it against AD or its cached
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domain verifier, so this does not grant access without a domain credential.
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credential to Windows only for a genuine broker/SGO outage. Windows must still
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validate it against AD or its cached domain verifier, so this does not grant
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access without a domain credential. This continuity path can accept a
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last-known AD password while SGO is unreachable; decide explicitly whether
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that availability trade-off is appropriate for each deployment.
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- usernames that do not match the institutional key format go directly to
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Windows and are never sent to SGU or provisioned by the broker.
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Windows and are never sent to SGU or provisioned by the broker.
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Allowing an SGO-accepted three-character password also allows that short
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password at the native AD logon surface. Broker rate limiting does not protect
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direct AD authentication; domain network exposure and monitoring therefore
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remain essential. The policy cannot make a weak upstream password strong.
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Redis is deliberately not used for password continuity. A second persistent
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password verifier duplicates attackable credential material, while a reversible
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