Limit reversible password storage to SGU accounts

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alexrg committed 2026-09-29 11:35:27 -06:00
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@@ -21,11 +21,19 @@ the same source list. RDP uses a separate allowlist. See
- The `SGU - Institutional password authority` fine-grained AD password policy
applies only to the global security groups `SGU-Alumnos`,
`SGU-Administrativos`, and `SGU-Docentes`. It disables AD complexity,
history, and password age requirements and permits passwords from one
character onward so a password accepted by SGO is never altered or rejected
by AD. The default domain password policy remains unchanged. The group is
assigned before `SetPassword` for newly created users. Bootstrap reapplies
the policy via `Set-SguInstitutionalPasswordPolicy.ps1`.
history, and password age requirements, permits passwords from one character
onward, and enables reversible password storage so passwords accepted by SGU
can be recorded unchanged by AD. The default domain password policy remains
unchanged for non-SGU accounts. The broker sets the per-user reversible-storage
flag before each `SetPassword`; bootstrap repairs existing role-group members
and reapplies the policy via `Set-SguInstitutionalPasswordPolicy.ps1`.
- Reversible password storage is a significant security reduction: a domain
controller stores a decryptable password representation. A privileged attacker
or administrator who obtains the relevant directory data can recover the
original password. This is limited to accounts in the three SGU role groups;
existing password values are converted only when SGU next resets them (normally
on a successful Acceso SGU sign-in). Do not enable this for unrelated domain
accounts.
- Managed `Usuarios-SGU` accounts deny the SELF and Everyone `Change Password`
extended right. Only an administrator or the broker through the separate
`Reset Password` right can replace the AD password.
@@ -98,21 +106,21 @@ Use an enterprise CA with revocation checking in production.
The provider distinguishes an SGU rejection from unavailable infrastructure:
- `400`/`401`: do not create or update the account and do not submit a Windows
credential. An explicit SGO rejection is authoritative, including when an
credential. An explicit SGU rejection is authoritative, including when an
older AD password still exists.
- `DIRECTORY_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILED`: SGO accepted the password but AD did not
- `DIRECTORY_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILED`: SGU accepted the password but AD did not
record it. Show a specific error and do not attempt Windows logon against a
potentially stale AD verifier.
- timeout, TLS/connectivity error, `429`, or `5xx`: submit the unchanged
credential to Windows only for a genuine broker/SGO outage. Windows must still
credential to Windows only for a genuine broker/SGU outage. Windows must still
validate it against AD or its cached domain verifier, so this does not grant
access without a domain credential. This continuity path can accept a
last-known AD password while SGO is unreachable; decide explicitly whether
last-known AD password while SGU is unreachable; decide explicitly whether
that availability trade-off is appropriate for each deployment.
- usernames that do not match the institutional key format go directly to
Windows and are never sent to SGU or provisioned by the broker.
Allowing an SGO-accepted three-character password also allows that short
Allowing an SGU-accepted three-character password also allows that short
password at the native AD logon surface. Broker rate limiting does not protect
direct AD authentication; domain network exposure and monitoring therefore
remain essential. The policy cannot make a weak upstream password strong.